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I first met Calvin Massey in person in 1994, when I joined the U.C. 
Hastings faculty.  However, I knew of and admired Calvin’s scholarship long 
before that.  Six years earlier, I was a law student at the University of 
Chicago, and a student editor at the law review.  In that role, I helped cite-
check and edit a major article authored by Calvin, as well as a series of 
short responses by Calvin and other scholars, debating the meaning and 
scope of the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.  I was struck then, 
and continue to be amazed, by the clarity, thoroughness, and intellectual 
rigor of this exchange, and especially Calvin’s contributions to it.  I truly 
believe that these papers provide a model for what engaged, respectful, and 
careful scholarly debate should look like.  They certainly provided an 
inspiration to me as I began my scholarly career, just as Calvin provided 
crucial mentorship during my early years at Hastings.  In this brief essay I 
summarize this intellectual exchange, and explain why I think it epitomizes 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Over 22 years ago, in the summer of 1994, I joined the faculty at U.C. 
Hastings College of the Law.  I had essentially no scholarly or teaching 
experience, and had to wear a suit every day to make sure everyone knew I 
wasn’t a student.  I had also just moved to California from the East Coast, 
and my wife, Shannon, and I knew nobody.  But that changed quickly.  We 
were warmly welcomed into the Hastings community by many, many people, 
including many in this room today.  I also quickly found scholarly mentors 
who helped me find my voice, and provided models for what it meant to be a 
rigorous, thoughtful, and engaged scholar.  In all of these respects, no one 
was more important to me than Calvin Massey. 
Calvin’s warmth, kindness, and generosity are well-known to everyone 
in this room.  I still have strong memories of a dinner party to which Calvin 
and Martha kindly invited Shannon and me during those early years, which 
gave us an object lesson in what graceful hospitality looks like.  But what I 
want to talk about was Calvin’s role as a scholarly mentor.  Because the thing 
is, when I arrived at Hastings, I was already familiar with Calvin’s work.  
Indeed, Calvin was the only member of the Hastings faculty whose 
scholarship I had previously been exposed to (not because of a lack of great 
scholars at Hastings, but because of my illiteracy), and an important factor 
drawing me to Hastings was the knowledge that Calvin was on that faculty.  
This is because although I’d never met him face-to-face, I also knew that the 
best I could hope to accomplish in my career was to try to emulate Calvin’s 
intellectual rigor. 
I. THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO 
 
Six years before I arrived at Hastings, I was a second-year law student at 
the University of Chicago, and a student editor at the University of Chicago 
Law Review.  That is when I was first exposed to Calvin the intellectual.  
Early in that year, the Law Review published an article titled “State 
Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments,” authored by (as 
you’ve probably guessed) then-Associate Professor Calvin Massey of 
Hastings.1  One of my first jobs on the Law Review was to help cite-check 
that article—no small task as the article was 91 pages long and had over 400 
footnotes!2  But it was an intellectual tour de force.  The subtlety and 
thoroughness of Calvin’s historical analysis still strikes me as a model of 
how to approach a difficult, even intractable problem, and make the best 
possible case for your position, knowing that final resolution is impossible. 																																																								
1  Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 61, 61 n.† (1989). 
2  Id. at 150–51. 
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But the story does not end with Calvin’s first piece.  Early the next 
academic year, then-Professor (now Judge) William Fletcher published a 
shorter piece in the Law Review, “replying to critics” of Fletcher’s position 
on this particular constitutional dispute3—“critics” referring to Calvin, as 
well as professors Lawrence Marshall (then at Northwestern, now at 
Stanford) and William Marshall (then at Case Western, now at the University 
of North Carolina), who had recently published articles on the same topic at 
Harvard.4  To make matters worse, the articles all analyzed opinions by both 
John Marshall and Thurgood Marshall, 5  creating a thorough-going 
Marshallian confusion.  I don’t recall if I worked on Fletcher’s article, but it 
was and is very impressive. 
And the story still doesn’t end.  The year we published Judge Fletcher’s 
piece, I was serving as one of the two Articles Editors at the Law Review.   
Someone—I believe it was Calvin, though don’t quote me on that—came up 
with the idea of continuing the ongoing dialogue I just described via short 
letters.  The result was a new (and unfortunately short-lived) section of the 
Law Review titled “Correspondence,” in which we published letters by 
Calvin and Professors Lawrence and William Marshall responding to 
Fletcher, and a short rebuttal by Fletcher.6 
I want to speak a little about the substance, and the style, of this scholarly 
back-and-forth for two reasons.  First of all, the topic remains very much 
relevant and contested today.  Second, I believe that Calvin’s role in this 
debate illustrates everything that I so admired about Calvin as a scholar. 
II. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT 
 
The basic subjects of Calvin’s original article, and all the other 
scholarship I just described, were the proper interpretation of the Eleventh 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, and the related question of the 
scope of the sovereign immunity enjoyed by state governments in our federal 
system.  The Eleventh Amendment reads: 																																																								
3  William A. Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation of the Eleventh Amendment: A 
Reply to Critics, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1261 (1989). 
4  Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 
HARV. L. REV. 1342 (1989); William P. Marshall, The Diversity Theory of the 
Eleventh Amendment: A Critical Evaluation, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1372 (1989). 
5  See, e.g., Massey, supra note 1, at 121–22 (discussing United States v. Peters, 
9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115 (1809) (Marshall, C.J.); id. at 126–28 (discussing Cohens v. 
Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821) (Marshall, C.J.) and Worcester v. Georgia, 
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) (Marshall, C.J.); id. at 145–46 (discussing Employees. of 
the Dep’t of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Dep’t of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 
279, 298 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring). 
6  Calvin R. Massey et al., Correspondence, Exchange on the Eleventh 
Amendment, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 117 (1990). 
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The Judicial power of the United States shall not be 
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced 
or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of 
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign 
State.7 
 
It was adopted in 1795, and its main purpose was to overturn the Supreme 
Court’s 1793 decision in Chisholm v. Georgia,8 which had permitted a 
lawsuit for breach of contract brought by a South Carolinian against the State 
of Georgia to proceed in federal court under the court’s diversity jurisdiction, 
despite the State’s claim of sovereign immunity.9  The Eleventh Amendment 
undoubtedly reversed that result.  The open question is what else it did. 
There is a longstanding scholarly and legal dispute about the meaning of 
the Eleventh Amendment.  The current position of the Supreme Court, which 
was first developed in 1890 in Han v. Louisiana,10 is that the Eleventh 
Amendment merely meant to restate a preexisting understanding that the 
States enjoyed sovereign immunity against lawsuits to which they do not 
consent, and that the adoption of the Constitution did not change that fact.11 
As a consequence, in Han the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment 
barred lawsuits in federal court against a State by its own citizens, even 
though the text only mentions citizens of other states and foreign countries.12  
In recent years, the Court has built on Han to extend Eleventh Amendment 
immunity to lawsuits in state courts,13 and before administrative agencies.14  
This position remains the law today. 
The primary alternative reading of the Eleventh Amendment, what 
Calvin called the “revisionist” reading, was developed by a group of scholars 
including Fletcher, Martha Field, Judge John Gibbons, and of course Akhil 
Amar, in the decade prior to Calvin’s article.15  It argues, based on text and 
history, that the Eleventh Amendment was intended to divest federal courts 
only of diversity jurisdiction over cases between States and citizens of other 
states or of foreign nations.  It had no impact on jurisdiction under other 
																																																								
7  U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
8  2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
9    U.S. CONST. amend. XI; Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 472–79 (opinion of Jay, 
C.J.). 
10  134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
11  Id. at 14–16. 
12  Id.  
13  Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
14  Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002). 
15  See Massey, supra note 1, at 61–62 n.2 (summarizing scholarship). 
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Article III heads, including notably federal question and admiralty 
jurisdiction.16 
Enter Calvin.  It will not surprise you to learn that Calvin disagreed with 
everybody.  He disagreed with the Court (and its supporters) that the 
Eleventh Amendment embodied any principle of sovereign immunity.  Thus 
he agreed with Fletcher, Amar et al. that Han was incorrectly decided17 (the 
decisions I described extending Han post-date this debate, but I’m sure 
Calvin found them dubious as well).  On the other hand, he also did not buy 
the “diversity” reading of the Eleventh Amendment because, as Calvin 
correctly pointed out, this reading meant that state treasuries remained 
vulnerable to lawsuits brought under federal law, including the Treaty of 
Paris that protected British creditors as well as British and Loyalist 
landowners from expropriation, a result the states surely would not have been 
comfortable with.18  Instead, Calvin read the Eleventh Amendment literally, 
as a party-based ouster of jurisdiction of the federal courts over all lawsuits 
brought against states by citizens of other states and of foreign nations, 
regardless of the subject matter of the lawsuit.19  It did not touch lawsuits by 
citizens of the state being sued, because such suits were not really the 
“problem” that the states faced (which was refusing to honor their debts and 
legal obligations as against outsiders),20 and while the particular compromise 
this created was not wholly logical, Calvin ably defended the view that the 
Eleventh Amendment was in fact an unprincipled political compromise 
between Federalists and Antifederalists21 (who were gradually morphing into 
Democratic Republicans—but that is a different story). 
What then of sovereign immunity?  Calvin went on to argue that even 
though the Eleventh Amendment has nothing to do with sovereign immunity, 
some concept of state sovereign immunity almost certainly was implicit in 
the concept of residual state sovereignty—a concept, he noted, which was 
embodied (or perhaps reiterated) in the Tenth Amendment, not the Eleventh 
(hence his title).22  This reading, however, has important consequences.  First 
and foremost, the Tenth Amendment recognizes residual state sovereignty 
only to the extent that power has not been delegated to the national 
government.23  That in turn means that when Congress does act pursuant to a 
legitimately delegated power (such as the Commerce Clause), it may lift state 
sovereign immunity, so long as it does so clearly.24  As it happens, precisely 																																																								
16  Id. at 62–63. 
17  Id. at 148–49. 
18  Id. at 114–15, 119, 149. 
19  Id. at 65–66, 113–14. 
20  Id. at 117. 
21  Id. at 119–120. 
22  Id. at 66, 143–44. 
23   Id. at 84.  
24  Id. at 144. 
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this question (whether Congress could lift state sovereign immunity when 
acting under the Commerce Clause) was pending at the Supreme Court when 
Calvin wrote, in a case called Pennsylvania v. Union Gas (on which more 
later),25 and Calvin’s views on that case were complex (again on which more 
later).  
Second, Calvin persuasively argued that whatever sovereign immunity 
states enjoyed was a matter of state constitutional law, not federal law, 
because state governments’ immunity had to derive from the sovereignty 
delegated to them by their citizens.26  As Calvin pointed out, there were 
profound differences even among the Framers on the proper scope of 
sovereign immunity.27  Many people adhered to it, for reasons principled or 
unprincipled—as the passage of the Eleventh Amendment indicated.  On the 
other hand, such eminent people as Attorney General Edmund Randolph, and 
Associate Justice (and Framer) James Wilson, believed that the very concept 
of sovereign immunity was incompatible with Republican forms of 
government.28  So, positing a firmly held, universal view on this question 
during the Framing era was absurd, making it more dubious to think that the 
Constitution itself took an all-or-nothing approach to the question. 
The ultimate implication of Calvin’s position was intriguing and 
counterintuitive.  It was that Congress could, pursuant to any of its 
enumerated powers, authorize lawsuits against states by their own citizens.29 
But (unlike Fletcher/Amar et al.), he concluded that it could NOT authorize 
suits in federal court at all by citizens of other states or of foreign nations.30  
Recognizing the unorthodox nature of his conclusions, Calvin’s article 
examines the historical evidence exhaustively (hence the 400 plus footnotes), 
from views on sovereign immunity during the Framing era, to the legal 
disputes of the 1790s that triggered the Eleventh Amendment, to the 
Amendment’s drafting history, to later treatments of the Eleventh 
Amendment in the pre-Han era, notably by Chief Justice John Marshall, to 
finally modern law (thus bringing in the fourth Marshall in our saga, 
Thurgood).  He also provided elegant arguments about why the Court’s 
modern view must be wrong—for example, pointing out that the Eleventh 
Amendment, by its terms, is a denial of jurisdiction to courts, yet under 
modern law states can “waive” their Eleventh Amendment immunity.  That 
is entirely counter to the bedrock principle that jurisdictional barriers cannot 
be waived by the parties.31  And so on—obviously I cannot here reiterate 																																																								
25  Id. at 147–50. 
26  Id. at 94–96. 
27  Id. at 87–97. 
28  Id. at 101–02, 90–93, 97. 
29   Id at 145.  
30  Id. 
31  Id. at 141–42. 
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arguments spread across 91 pages of dense text, and I imagine you are 
grateful that I don’t intend to try. 
One of the notable aspects of the Massey/Fletcher debate was how much 
they agreed upon.  Both agreed that Han was wrong.  Both agreed that views 
on the scope of state sovereign immunity during the Framing era were 
unsettled.  And in their last exchange, both conceded that there will always 
exist some uncertainty about the intended or best meaning of the Eleventh 
Amendment, because the historical record is so sparse and confused.32  But, 
they also of course disagreed. 
So what happened?  In Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, the Court (by a 
bizarre 4-1-4 vote) upheld Congress’s Commerce Clause authority to lift 
state sovereign immunity,33 a result supported by Fletcher.  Calvin’s position 
was more subtle.  He would have permitted this lawsuit in federal court if 
Union Gas was a Pennsylvania citizen, but not if it was a citizen of another 
state34—a fact which the Court ignored, because it only mattered under 
Calvin’s approach.  Regardless, seven years later in Seminole Tribe of 
Florida v. Florida,35 the Court (with new membership) overruled Union Gas, 
and adopted the position (still good law today) that Congress may not 
abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity pursuant to its Article I powers36—
though it remains the law that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment does 
authorize such abrogation.37 
So who was right, Calvin or Fletcher?  Honestly, I have no idea.  Unlike 
Vik Amar and Evan Lee, I am no Federal Courts scholar, and I’ve avoided 
the Eleventh Amendment avidly in my own scholarship.  I don’t even teach it 
in Constitutional Law.  Both positions are plausible, and both have both 
strengths and weaknesses.  What I am confident about, however, is that 
Calvin and Fletcher were both undoubtedly correct that Han v. Louisiana is 
wrong.  Yet almost thirty years after that debate, Han is still good law. 
III. CALVIN THE SCHOLAR 
 
What are we to learn from this saga?  First, how frustrating it is to be a 
law professor, to be right, and to be ignored by the courts.  But seriously, I 
think this debate illustrates some very important points about Calvin’s 
scholarship, and his broader intellectual legacy.  The starting point, of course, 
is the care, thoroughness, and extraordinary rigor that went into all of his 
work.  His 1989 article really is a prodigy—it struck me as such as a second 																																																								
32  Massey et al., supra note 6, at 118, 121–22, 139. 
33  Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 23 (1989). 
34  Massey, supra note 1, at 149–50. 
35  517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
36  Id. at 57–73. 
37  Id. at 65–66; Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 726 (2003). 
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year law student, and my view was reaffirmed when I reread the article this 
past summer. 
The other noteworthy aspect of this sequence of events was that despite 
deep differences among the participants, they all treated one another with 
extraordinary respect and courtesy, and freely conceded that the people they 
disagreed with were not only not crazy, but indeed perfectly reasonable.  
Calvin thanks Fletcher as a friend in his first author’s footnote.38  Fletcher’s 
reply thanks Calvin and both Professors Marshall, naming them as friends.39  
And in the final set of letters, everyone is willing to concede the strength of 
some of the opposing arguments, and some of the potential weaknesses of 
their position (though unsurprisingly no one retreated much).  I believed in 
1989–1990, and I continue to believe now, that this exchange provided a 
model of how scholarly debate is supposed to proceed. 
Finally, something distinctly Calvin.  In the Eleventh Amendment 
debate, the main positions have taken on a distinctly partisan aspect (as I 
guess has almost everything else in constitutional law these days, and in our 
society more broadly).  “Liberals” favor the diversity thesis of Fletcher, 
Amar et al.  “Conservatives” stick to Han and broad state sovereign 
immunity.  Han remains the law, and indeed has been extended (and Union 
Gas overruled) because of a series of close, 5-4 votes along ideological lines.  
(As an aside, divides used to be ideological not partisan—Republican 
appointees like Souter, Stevens and Blackmun might be “liberal,” while 
Democratic appointees like White might be “conservative.”  No longer.)  
Likewise, views on these issues in the academy also tend to match partisan 
preferences. 
Not Calvin.  His argument rejecting the diversity thesis was 
“conservative,” because it entirely forbade some federal question lawsuits in 
federal court against the states.  On the other hand, his position on 
Congress’s power to abrogate state sovereign immunity in cases not within 
the text of the Eleventh Amendment was “liberal,” because it empowered 
Congress vis à vis state governments.  This is typical.  Calvin is one of the 
very few constitutional scholars of whom I can honestly say that his 
scholarship reveals essentially nothing about his politics.  His view (I 
remember him sharing it) was that scholarship was about thoroughness and 
intellectual rigor.  If that took you to a liberal place, so be it.  If it took you to 
a conservative place, so be it.  Truth trumps politics.  Calvin is sorely missed 
for so many reasons—it is hard to recount them all.  But in 2016 his rigor, 
his rationality, and his commitment to the truth above all are in particularly 
short supply, and are particularly missed. 
																																																								
38  Massey, supra note 1, at 61 n.†. 
39  Fletcher, supra note 3, at 1261 n.†. 
